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Abstract The paper shows how a framework adapted from Toulmin (1958) was valuable in 
exploring the force of online argument in an educational setting. In past research of online 
discussions there has been a focus on interaction patterns at the expense of exploring 
questions of content. In seeking to address this imbalance, we used Toulmin’s key terms of 
claim, data, warrant, rebuttal and backing in an analysis of an educational network for young 
learners (13-18) in which a debate on whether Britain should leave the EU was carried out. 
Drawing on these key terms, a framework was constructed in order to categorise messages as: 
claims with no force; insufficient argument; constructed argument; forceful argument. This 
framework was used to unpack the claims and warrants put forward in the course of the 
debate. The paper shows that Toulmin’s approach can be adapted to provide a feasible and 
useful framework for assessing the force of argument within forums. However, it is 
recognised that there are also challenges and limitations in using such an approach. 
KEYWORDS Argument; Online Forums; Toulmin. 
Sommario L’articolo mostra l’utilità di un framework adattato da Toulmin (1958) per 
esplorare la forza di una argomentazione online in un contesto educativo. Nelle ricerche 
precedenti sulle argomentazioni online ci si è concentrati sui modelli di interazione a scapito 
dell'esplorazione delle questioni relative ai contenuti. Nel cercare di affrontare questo 
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squilibrio, abbiamo utilizzato i termini chiave di tesi (claim), dati (data), garanzia (warrant), 
riserva (rebuttal) e fondamento (backing) di Toulmin nell’analisi di una rete educativa per 
giovani studenti (13-18) in cui è stato condotto un dibattito sull'eventualità che la Gran 
Bretagna abbandonasse l'UE. Attingendo a questi termini chiave, è stato costruito un 
framework per classificare i messaggi come: tesi senza forza (claims with no force); 
argomentazione insufficiente (insufficient argument); argomentazione articolata (constructed 
argument); argomentazione forte (forceful argument). Il framework è stato utilizzato per 
analizzare le tesi e le garanzie presentati nel corso del dibattito. L’articolo mostra come 
l'approccio di Toulmin possa essere adattato per fornire un framework utile per valutare la 
forza di un’argomentazione all'interno di un forum. Tuttavia, viene anche evidenziato che 
esistono sfide e limitazioni nell'utilizzo di tale approccio. 
PAROLE CHIAVE Argomentazione; Forum online; Toulmin. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of online environments, including online forums, blogs and other social 
networking, was once heralded as offering opportunities for inclusive debate in which 
members had the time and space to read and offer views undistracted by visual clues. These 
opportunities applied to not just teaching and learning contexts (Austin, 2006; Boyd, 1996; 
McConnell, 2000), but also to community networks and civil society more generally (Boshier, 
1990; Rheingold, 1993; 2008). Such opportunities continue to exist but early enthusiasm has 
been dampened by awareness of the sometimes chaotic nature of participation in formal 
learning (Eve & Brabazon, 2008) and the tendency for social networking to reinforce existing 
beliefs, as in the phenomenon of 'echo chambers' (Boutyline & Willer,2017; Del Vicario et 
al., 2016), rather than support reflexivity and the exploration of counter argument. These 
difficulties have led to questions over the quality of online activity in general and concern 
over online argument in particular (Paglieri & Reed, 2017). However, if we are to criticise the 
conduct of online argument then we need to have some criteria for helping to identify what a 
good argument looks like. This paper suggests Toulmin’s framework can help. In particular, it 
shows how Toulmin’s key work (Toulmin, 1958) can be adapted to provide a feasible and 
useful tool for understanding the force of argument in online discussion. 
The paper begins by looking at the education technology approach to analysing online 
interaction before shifting to consider how argument has been treated in the education 
literature. This shift leads us directly to Toulmin and his framework based around the analysis 
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of claim, data, warrant and backing in an argument. We then move on to showing how the 
Toulmin framework was adapted to analyse a discussion about leaving the EU, one which 
took place in an educational network for young learners (13-18). Finally, the strength of the 
Toulmin approach are discussed along with its limitations. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Analysis of online knowledge building: The educational technology tradition 
In seeking to deepen our understanding of online discussion one well-trodden path is to 
present frameworks for analysing the messages themselves, in other words: what are these 
messages designed to do? Here much of the work in the field of educational technology 
research has focused on knowledge building communities and communities of practice 
(Anderson, 2004; Cacciamani, Perrucci, & Khanlari, 2018; Garrison, Anderson, & Archer, 
2010; Gunawardena, Lowe, & Anderson, 1997; Henri & Pudelko, 2003; Lee, Son, & Lee, 
2005; Salmon, Nie, & Edirisingha, 2010; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2014; Zhang, Scardamalia, 
Reeve, & Messina, 2009). Early work in this tradition made recurring reference to Henri 
(1992) in which an analytical model based around participation, interaction, social, cognitive 
and metacognitive dimensions of messages was proposed. Later, Gunawardena, Lowe and 
Anderson (1997) put forward an ‘interaction analysis’ model in order to show the social 
construction of knowledge around five phases starting with the sharing and comparing of 
information, through to noticing inconsistency and negotiation of meaning, and finishing with 
agreement or application of newly constructed meaning. Meanwhile, Garrison, Anderson and 
Archer's (2010) Community of Inquiry model contained three elements, namely social, 
cognitive and teaching presence, and Salmon, Nie and Edirisingha (2010) proposed a five-
stage model, which categorised participation from access and motivation, through information 
exchange leading to knowledge construction development. Many researchers have used these 
schema creatively to come up with new models, for example Ke and Xie (2009) categorise 
interactions into three dimensions (socializing, knowledge construction and regulation of 
learning), while Pezzotti and Gambini (2012) draw creatively on knowledge construction 
literature and extend it in important ways. 
Frameworks have considerable value for mapping patterns of argument, counter argument and 
consensus as they can help to identify critical processes in online participation. It seems 
likely, for example, that the construction of knowledge will take place at, say, the level of 
negotiation of meaning rather than socialisation, and that evidence of counter argument 
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suggests a robust process of debate. Indeed, a stimulus to pioneer researchers in the field of 
online text analysis was the possibility of being able to quite literally chart the construction of 
new knowledge as message archives seemed to provide a complete account of interaction 
within a group. However, if such a goal was to be achieved then researchers needed to get the 
categorisation of messages right. In particular, they needed to explain not only how new 
knowledge was created but why this new knowledge was worth paying attention to. However 
here was a gap. After all members of a group may construct knowledge by articulating claims 
and addressing counter claims, but do any of the agreements which participants arrive at carry 
any force? Of course validity criteria are not entirely absent from many of the schema used to 
analyse online texts. For example, Gunawardena, Lowe, and Anderson (1997) suggested that 
any new knowledge co-constructed by members should be tested against cultural 
assumptions; experience; cognitive schema; testimony and data. Garrison, Anderson, and 
Archer (2001) saw a kind of pragmatic claim to new knowledge as its usefulness in practice. 
Scardamalia and Bereiter (2014) drew attention to processes, e.g. offering insightful 
interpretation or providing supportive/disconfirming findings, which needed to be present in 
creating authentic knowledge. And Pezzotti and Gambini (2012) put forward content 
indicators ('Indicatori di contenuto') in respect to the source of knowledge on which 
participants draw. However, we argue that these fall short of offering the kind of forensic 
analysis needed to establish the quality of an argument. This leads to the wider question, 'Can 
the quality of argument really be evaluated?'. One place to look for an answer is the 
educational literature. 
2.2 The education literature on argument 
Argument has been explored in many contexts, chiefly in school, and has been particularly 
well represented in science education with major projects carried out at the turn of the last 
century (Erduran, Simon, & Osborne, 2004; Pontecorvo, 1987; Schwarz, Neuman, Gil, & 
Ilya, 2003). Argument is consistently seen as productive for learning and a form of discourse 
that needs to be appropriated by children and explicitly taught (Erduran et al.,  2004). 
Engaging in argument encourages learners to externalise their thinking and hold it up to self-
scrutiny, and the scrutiny of others, for it is through argument that learners are led to explore 
the relationship between evidence and claim (Stegmann, Weinberger, Fischer, & Mandl, 
2014). Nussbaum, Hartley, Sinatra, Reynolds, and Bendixen (2004) tie argument closely to 
the idea of higher order thinking and Duschl and Osborne (2002) see argument as contributing 
to the development of three cognitive dimensions: one is 'metacognitive processes' (knowing 
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how to learn); the second is 'metastrategic processes' (knowing which strategies to deploy); 
and the third is 'epistemological framework' (an understanding of how we know). 
Given what has been said about its value, the teaching of argument should be a priority across 
all sectors. However, there is one overriding conclusion to be drawn from the literature: there 
have been, and continue to be, considerable weaknesses in the conduct of argument (Kuhn, 
1992; Nussbaum, Hartley, Sinatra, Reynolds, & Bendixen, 2004; Stegmann et al., 2004). 
Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) forensically examine some of these weaknesses. For example, in 
many cases concerning young people’s scientific understanding argument stopped with 
covariation (X rises with Y hence X must be the cause of Y). Other weaknesses include 
engaging in counterfactual reasoning (presenting alternative accounts of what actually 
happened), discounting (ignoring more comprehensive explanations for preferred ones) and 
analogy (a tendency to think about objects of inquiry in terms of what was already familiar). 
A key feature of weak argument is its failure to engage with alternative explanations and its 
reliance on ‘pseudoevidence’ (Nussbaum & Schraw, 2007). Nussbaum et al. (2004) further 
suggest that a good argument successfully integrates argument and counterargument. Indeed, 
students often do not realise that considering and rebutting a counterclaim often increases the 
persuasiveness of their argument. 
Conducting an argument is not straightforward. At the individual level, argument is seen as 
carrying a high cognitive load (Coirier, Andriessen, & Chanquoy, 1999), allied to which 
many students seek to maintain ‘cognitive consistency’ rather than consider new explanations 
(see the review by Simon & Holyoak, 2002). Underlying resistance to argument at both 
individual teacher and student levels are: beliefs about epistemology (for example, difficulty 
in accepting the fallible nature of knowledge and hence the need for argument at all); 
personality type (for example, the difficulty some experience in accepting uncertainty); and 
preferred learning style or  a preference for surface rather than deep learning (Oh & Jonassen, 
2007). At a macro level, there are further constraints, for example the prevailing emphasis on 
testing recall of knowledge, and gaps in teacher training (Simon, 2008). Not surprisingly, 
many researchers, including Anderson, Guerreiro, and Smith (2016), Littleton & Whitelock 
(2005) and Mercer (1995) have seen the need to assist young people in developing argument 
skills and for supporting teachers in leading and modelling argument. 
2.3 Toulmin and what makes a good argument 
It is one thing to propose the modelling of argument, but what should this modelling consist 
of? To answer this question, we need to know what a 'good' argument looks like and here a 
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recurring point of reference has been, and remains, Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin’s Use of 
Argument (1958) has been adopted in many areas including linguistics, psychology, 
philosophy, law and politics. More crucially, for this paper, Toulmin has also been influential 
in education. For example, Bacha (2010) and Qin & Karabacak (2010), along with many 
others, have used the Toulmin framework for analysing and supporting academic writing in 
higher education. In school contexts, Toulmin has been influential in science education 
(Erduran et al., 2004; Jimenez-Aleixandre, Rodriguez, & Duschl, 2000) and is a point of 
reference for many other disciplines (Lee, 2017; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993). Toulmin has, 
however, only rarely been applied in an online context (Blake & Scanlon, 2014). 
The basic idea of Toulmin’s Use of Argument is that arguments can be considered in terms of 
claims, data, warrant, and backing. The claim (C) is the argument whose merits we are 
seeking to establish (for example, ‘the moon is made of cheese’). The data (D) are the facts 
we appeal to as a foundation for the claim (‘the moon looks like a round cheese’). The 
warrant (W) covers more general hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges, to make 
the argument coherent (‘given the moon is round and certain cheeses are round we can 
conclude that the moon is made of cheese’). Any warrant and claim can be qualified by, for 
example, saying ‘the moon might/could be made of cheese’ but other claims are possible. 
Arguments generally proceed by claim and counter claim (CC) and CCs can similarly be 
supported by data, warrant and backing. All claims can be subject to rebuttal (R) (for 
example, an acceptance that the claim being put forward is a partial and not a general case, 
such as in ‘moons are generally made of rock but the Earth’s moon is different’). Finally, an 
argument needs backing (B). This refers to the background understanding in a particular field 
that would give authority to the warrant. In the moon example there is an implicit but quite 
erroneous backing for the claim in the idea that the appearance of a physical object, in relation 
to known objects, has geological significance. Backing then is extremely important and as 
Toulmin puts it ‘to call such an argument formally valid is to say only something about the 
manner in which it has been phrased, and tells us nothing about the reasons for its validity. 
These reasons are to be understood only when we turn to consider the backing of the warrant 
invoked’ (Toulmin, 1958, p.132). One issue here is that while data are generally appealed to 
explicitly, the backing and even the warrant is often left implicit in an argument. In discussing 
planetary movements, for example, astrophysical laws do not need to be, and more 
importantly cannot be, endlessly repeated so long as they are accepted by all participants. 
Toulmin is often evoked to provide grounds for establishing the validity of arguments though 
Toulmin himself more usually wrote about the ‘force’ of an argument. As Toulmin put it, 
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there was a structure to argument (including elements of claim, data, warrant, backing, 
rebuttal) which was common across all argument (i.e. field independent), but there was 
discipline knowledge that needed to be brought to an argument which was field dependent. 
This put Toulmin at odds with logicians, in that he argued there was much more to consider 
about a text than its formal structure, but later he was also at odds with post-structuralism by 
arguing that there was an identifiable structure to a text. Post-structuralists emphasised the 
multiple meanings which a text afforded and the instability of language, for all meaning was 
nested within other meaning (Elliot, 2014). By contrast, Toulmin had found a way of moving 
against the logical positivist tradition, while maintaining an interest, drawing on Aristotle, in 
how logical reasoning can play out in practical contexts. His stance was a largely pragmatic 
one which aimed to integrate objectivist and subjectivist ways of thinking and this position 
remained broadly consistent throughout his career (Toulmin, 1977). 
There were other frameworks both within the educational technology and classroom talk 
literature which appeared easier to apply (for example, the categories of disputational, 
cumulative and exploratory talk in Littleton & Whitelock, 2005), but there were three things 
which attracted us to Toulmin as an approach to understanding online argument. First, his 
schema did not solely focus on the form an argument took (as was the case in much of the 
knowledge building literature), it had to consider knowledge of the field. In fact, Toulmin 
tended to equate field with discipline knowledge, but in this paper content knowledge is used 
to better reflect that backing for arguments often cuts across discipline or subject boundaries. 
Second, his broadly pragmatic stance on knowledge made Toulmin seemed to fit well with 
the anti-foundational ontology often associated with those proposing online discussion 
(McConnell, 2000). Third, there was a great deal of literature on the use of Toulmin in 
physical classrooms on which to draw when examining online settings. 
3. METHODS 
3.1 Context for the research 
We wanted to consider whether Toulmin’s use of argument could help in analysis of online 
debate, in particular whether it could fill a gap by identifying the force of the claims that 
members were putting forward in a way that the knowledge construction literature had not. To 
do so called for empirical investigation. The context for this investigation was an educational 
online network, namely IGGY. IGGY was created at the University of Warwick for 
academically 'gifted' young people, aged 13 to 18 and it ran from 2012–2017. Membership of 
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the network was open to any young person in that age group whose parents, carers or teachers 
vouched that it would be of value to them. 
IGGY was a distinctive example of an online network as it offered members social interaction 
with people that in many cases they had not physically met. In addition, it offered a good deal 
of structured, optional, learning content covering areas such as history, politics, science, 
languages and so on (see Charalampidi, Hammond, & Boddison, 2014). According to IGGY’s 
database, the network had around 7,000 active members. These members came from all over 
the world, though most lived in the UK. The majority of the members were female but data on 
gender were not routinely collected. An important feature of IGGY was the high level of 
participation safety so that the network was closed to non-members, members used 
anonymised avatars and participation was monitored carefully by organisers for inappropriate 
activity. 
We had already carried out a great deal of work aimed at understanding members’ 
perspectives on participation in IGGY (Charalampidi & Hammond, 2016). For example, 
active members tended to use the network for a number of reasons: to address lack of 
challenge at school, to access learning resources, to meet new people, to communicate with 
other members, and to learn about other cultures. IGGY was an educational community 
within which those who actively participated felt trust, empathy and respect. The main 
constraints in using IGGY was lack of time and learning to navigate the network which meant 
that some members were not active, or only active in particular areas - for example some 
accessed the learning materials but did not take part in discussion, and some accessed the 
discussions but not the learning material.  
In this paper our interest lies in the forums within IGGY. IGGY had designated broad topics 
for debate, for example Writing wrongs; Essay competition; Careers and personal 
development; What’s it like to be gifted; Education and the internet; and Politics. Many 
debates ran concurrently so that although each debate thread only generated modest numbers 
of contributions, discussion as a whole was widespread and frequent. The forum archive was 
organised around 15 themes with 5,389 topic threads and 47,004 messages in its first four 
years. Our study focused on one of the more topical and discursive debates in the Politics 
section, Should UK leave the EU? This debate took place from May 2015 to June 2016, with 
103 contributions from 49 forum members, including two student mentors. Other debates 
were analysed too and details of a comparative study are provided in a supplementary file to 
this paper (Hammond & Charalampidi, 2019). 
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Before carrying out the analysis of the EU debate reported here we had already carried out 
quantitative analysis of several debates (including data on the number of contributions and the 
pattern of contributions) and a functional analysis of large units of meaning using the key 
codes Triggering a discussion (T), Inviting a response (R) and Stating (S) (Charalampidi & 
Hammond, 2016). This work was helpful in understanding the flow of argument but it was of 
limited value in helping to understand the force of argument. This is what led back to 
Toulmin. 
3.2 The framework of analysis 
Toulmin needed adapting if it was to be used as a way of understanding the comparative 
merits of arguments. We drew heavily on a framework constructed by Erduran, Simon, and 
Osborne (2004) and Simon (2008) in which five different levels of argument were identified. 
They range from Level 1, a simple claim without supporting data, to level 5, a claim with 
data, warrant, and backing with a recognition as to how the claim may be qualified or 
rebutted. This framework, however, needed further adaption. First, numerical labels (1, 2, 3, 
4, 5) were replaced with something more descriptive. Second, each level was broadened, for 
example our category insufficient argument could capture different types of weakness 
including absence of W but also lack of clarity in respect to W. Third, Erduran et al.’s level 5 
(‘displays an extended argument with more than one rebuttal’) set the bar too high. Indeed, 
Toulmin’s own work on argument seemed driven by an interest in jurisprudence and how 
legal arguments were constructed in order to integrate different claims within quite long and 
detailed texts. In contrast, in this study the texts were shorter and were made by young 
learners, rather than practising lawyers. 
Four categories were constructed to describe participant contributions: claims with no force; 
insufficient arguments; constructed arguments and forceful argument with a fifth category 
(uncoded) to cover messages which did not contain claims. For example, a message (which 
constituted the unit of meaning) that simply stated that immigration would go down if the UK 
left the EU was a claim with no force. If this claim was complemented by a general statement 
about border controls, then this made an insufficient argument. If the message contained a 
coherent bridge between having border controls and levels of immigration this would make a 
constructed argument. Meanwhile, a forceful argument would bring greater clarity, for 
example it might present data on levels of migration, it might bring in qualifications, such as 
recognition that much would be uncertain post-Brexit, as well as reflection on why migration 
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was considered a good or bad thing. Table 1 illustrates extracts from posts to give an idea as 
to the application of the framework. 
 
Level  Definition 
(C=Claim, D=Data, 
W=Warrant, B=Backing) 
Extract: Illustrative examples  
No Force C made without D or where 
the link between D and C is 
unclear, or where D is 
factually incorrect (often 
with a deceptive intention) 
A standalone statement: 
I think that we should stay in the EU 
Leaving the EU could be a breath of fresh air 
All laws require EU approval 
We are a very small island we are very vulnerable 
Insufficient 
Argument 
C made with supporting D. 
The W can be deduced but is 
not clear 
We should leave. [C] We are in a lot of debt and will 
continue to lose money if we continue to send it to 
countries in the EU. [D] 
We should stay [C]. The EU provides us with back up 
in case a war breaks out [D] 
Constructed 
Argument 
C made with supporting D, 
and with an explicit W or a 
W that can be easily 
identified 
[C] Stay…..Several large companies have suggested 
that if the UK leaves the EU they will also move away 
from the UK, meaning that jobs here will be lost. [D] 
 
Forceful 
Argument 
As above but generally 
longer. D is explored 
critically while B is referred 
to or easily deducible 
R and Q strengthen rather 
than weaken argument 
 
I am fully aware of how immigration is good for our 
work force, but in my opinion the social and 
environmental detriments are a major factor [R] 
As a UK resident with a French nationality, I believe 
leaving the EU will not only impact me and my family 
but all those who have immigrated from the EU to 
England. [Q] 
Uncoded No argument being 
expressed 
These covered clarification or correction of facts, 
links to news or links to other resources, and trigger 
questions for discussion. 
 
 
Table 1: Level descriptors used for categorisation of messages 
 
Applying the framework was not straightforward. Indeed, the debate on EU membership was 
particularly difficult as it threw up a range of issues whose importance was not agreed upon 
and the merits of which crossed different fields: economics, law, moral conduct and politics. 
For example, participants were drawing on claims about the contribution of EU membership 
to economic performance but also assessing whether national sovereignty was more or less 
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important than economic output. Moreover, claims rested in part on counterfactuals: what 
would happen to the economy if UK left the EU or what would have happened if UK had not 
had joined in the first place. We were challenged throughout to reach agreement as what 
counted as relevant data and we were further challenged to background our own feelings 
about EU membership, for example by recognising a tendency to over-compensate when 
analysing positions with which we disagreed. Finally, we had decided to categorise at a whole 
text level but this required best-fit judgments in the case of longer messages containing 
different types of claim. 
On our first run with the coding framework we, the two authors of this paper, reached 
agreement in 55 out of the 103 messages. There was a high level of consistency in applying 
the codes uncoded, no force and insufficient but less consistency in applying the categories of 
constructed argument and forceful. At this point we engaged in a prolonged discussion as 
what was reasonable in the terms of content knowledge for this group of participants. In a 
second round we found consistency in 27 out of the 58 disputed codes, and reached agreement 
over the remaining 31 after further conversation. We refer back to the issues this search for 
agreement raises in the discussion. 
4. FINDINGS 
The messages (n=103) were categorised across the full range of levels (Table 2) with 
constructed argument the modal category. After taking away the uncoded category, the 
number of constructed and forceful arguments just outweighed the combined total of no force 
or insufficient arguments. This suggests that the quality of argument was varied but did at 
times reach an impressive level for this age group. 
 
Codes Should Britain leave the EU? 
No force 26 (25.2) 
Insufficient argument 15 (14.6) 
Constructed argument 30 (29.1) 
Forceful argument 13 (12.6) 
Uncoded 19 (18.4) 
TOTAL 103 (100.0) 
Table 2. Frequency with which messages were coded (percentages in brackets). 
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Having constructed the framework for analysis, the nature of the claims put forward about the 
EU could be unpacked by breaking down the D, W and B that underlay claims. There was 
agreement by both ‘Remainers’ and ‘Leavers’ that the issues at stake covered the economic, 
political and social consequences, including migration and security (Table 3).  
 
Claims  Data Warrant Backing  
UK should 
stay in the EU 
(n=42 
messages) 
Economic 
Manufacturing has an EU wide supply 
chain; trade easier with EU as it is tariff 
free; data on costs offered by leave side 
is misleading; migrants don't steal jobs. 
Alternatives to EU are unsatisfactory: 
new trade and political relationships are 
unlikely / will bring risks / too much is 
unknown; freer trade with rest of the 
world is unlikely; freer trade if possible 
may result in flooding of cheap goods. 
 
EU provides 
economic and 
political security. 
 
Free movement 
within the EU brings 
economic 
advantages. 
 
 
Economic 
prosperity is based 
on secure 
relationships. 
Trade is a 
principle concern 
in political 
decision making; 
free movement 
balances demand 
and supply. 
 Political and social 
Political security stronger within EU; 
EU protects and rebalances resources; 
third country migration needs to be 
tackled at an EU level; disruption and 
loss to those who have moved to UK 
from EU and to EU from UK; travel in 
EU is now straightforward; crises need 
to be tackled at EU level. 
 
Disruption is 
damaging. 
 
EU is an effective 
political organisation. 
 
 
Secure political 
alliances depend 
on trade blocks. 
 
Problems are 
international/ 
global not 
national. 
UK should 
leave the EU 
(n=42 
messages) 
Economic 
EU is a declining trade block; financial 
cost of membership is too high; 
countries of EU are unevenly 
developed; trade outside EU is subject 
to tariffs; leaving will give more 
freedom to trade with other countries 
outside EU; free movement threatens 
jobs. 
 
More freedom over 
trade deals will bring 
economic 
advantages. 
Countries require 
bespoke economic 
policies. 
Migration controls 
will result in more 
jobs for UK people. 
 
A protected labour 
market has 
predictable 
consequences for 
employment. 
Political decisions 
at the EU level 
can interfere with 
sound economic 
policies. 
 Political /social   
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Immigration (via EU) brings social 
disruption; little control over EU 
decisions e.g. tax and migration; EU not 
responsive to member countries; a 
points based system for migration 
possible outside EU. 
Control over 
migration could lead 
to more beneficial 
systems. 
 
National 
sovereignty is 
rational and 
mutually 
beneficial at a 
worldwide level. 
Undecided Difficult to get full information; pros 
balance cons; too much uncertainty; 
alternatives have not been explained 
  
No view 
expressed 
Requests for more information; links to 
sites; expressing thanks for 
contributions 
  
 
Table 3: The architecture of the debate. 
There was an exact balance between messages supporting Remain and Leave in the discussion 
though among participants there were slightly more Remainers than Leavers. These data seem 
to run counter to the general idea that young people were overwhelmingly positive towards the 
EU (in regards to the UK, see Sloam, 2016). 
5. DISCUSSION 
The study began by suggesting there was a problem with how we considered online message 
analysis and by asking whether it was both feasible and useful to adapt a Toulmin framework 
to assess the quality of an argument. We found that it was. 
As regards feasibility, it was possible to draw on Toulmin to construct a framework to 
categorise the messages within the forum in terms of claims with no force; insufficient 
arguments; constructed arguments and forceful argument. We found this framework was 
workable and gave important insight into the quality of the debate. It should, however, be 
made clear that although Toulmin was preferred to more complex frameworks (including 
Walton, 2015), categories were not easy to apply. This was because warrant and backing are 
rarely made explicit in an argument, they need to be inferred and different readers will infer 
different things. Once content comes into the analysis then coding becomes more difficult, 
and more difficult than generally recognised. To consider content, coders require an 
understanding of the subject matter: what they know about a topic; how they came to know 
about that topic; what data and what patterns of association are allowable within a topic area 
and so on. Judgments about content knowledge have to be appropriate for forum members, in 
this case what can be expected from this particular age group. This suggests that 
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categorisation will always be influenced by the positionality of those carrying out the analysis 
and decisions arrived at will be based on best fit. In this respect the concept of inter-rater 
reliability, with its focus on the search for consistency, comes with positivist associations 
(Anderson, Guerreiro, & Smith, 2016) which distort the process of reaching agreement. In our 
study we found a lack of consistency was not only inevitable but also valuable in reaching a 
critical shared understanding of how the codes should be applied. 
Toulmin's interest in content knowledge is then a source of difficulty for the coder but also a 
source of strength for analysis. Toulmin does not provide a checklist against which claims can 
be considered true or false, but by adapting his approach we could offer explicit grounds for 
saying why one argument appeared better than another. Furthermore, while Toulmin is largely 
used to assess the force of argument at a micro level (the claims put forward in a particular 
text) we were able to use a Toulmin framework to show the architecture of a debate, i.e. the 
nature of the particular claims, the types of data considered relevant, and the warrants and 
backings that were being offered. Our results show that it is possible to make a forceful 
argument both for leaving and remaining in the EU. Forceful arguments engaged with a 
broader set of issues (for example, levels of migration from outside the EU in debates about 
border control) and indicated how interpretations were distorted by experience and position 
(for example, some participants from EU countries recognised they had a special interest if 
living in the UK). It is often assumed by those debating EU membership that there must be 
predictable outcomes from leaving the EU in relation to issues such as migration, economic 
prosperity and security. Those arguing more forcefully showed it was more complicated than 
that. 
A Toulmin approach appears both feasible and useful but it does come with some limitations. 
First, we cannot rely on Toulmin to understand the educational value of argument, we need to 
go back to the education literature. Here argument is seen as an important educational goal 
(Duschl & Osborne 2002; Mercer, 1995; Nussbaum et al., 2004; Stegmann et al.,  2014) and 
networks like IGGY should be seen as providing an important apprenticeship in argument. In 
this sense the willingness to put ideas forward, to consider other viewpoints and to change 
one's mind in the face of a stronger argument are important qualities or 'virtues' in themselves 
(Cohen, 2017). A distinction made by Bowell and Kingsbury (2013) helps in understanding 
argument as virtue. They see two approaches: the reliabilist position, which is more focused 
on standard cognitive reasoning, and the responsibilist one, in which the arguer is prepared to 
follow the argument wherever it leads. Metaphorically the first seems suggestive of a lawyer 
weighing up a brief, the second of more a detective following a trail. These two positions are 
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not incompatible but Toulmin leads us to focus more on the former at the expense of the 
latter. Different categories are needed to go down the responsibilist route and here, as an 
example, Schwarz and De Groot (2007) argue that developing autonomy, collaboration, 
commitment to reasoning, ethical communication and procedural mediation are important foci 
for analysis. 
Second, a particular gap in the Toulmin approach is that, unlike the Habermasian perspective 
with which it shares a broadly pragmatic orientation, it does not engage with a wider 
sociological tradition (Hammond, 2015). This means Toulmin has little to say about how 
power is exercised, implicitly or explicitly, within groups or how our reading of a text takes 
place in a wider context – compare here with externalisation and socialisation as issues in van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser's (2015) pragma-dialetics. 
Third, a shortcoming in Toulmin is that he is focused on content rather than voice and 
register. In fact, our interest in this debate was triggered by an appreciation that contributions 
in IGGY lacked the vitriol that seemed ever present in public forums on EU membership at 
the time. For example, disagreements among these younger participants were often tempered 
by recognition that others might see the same facts in a different way and disagreement was 
focused on the argument not on the person. This civility pointed again to the educational 
purpose of the forum but to understand how and why such civility was maintained we would 
need, again, to go beyond message analysis and explore intentions of those involved. 
Finally, not all educational networks created for young people need have the same 
commitment to argumentation. They may, for example, seek to support the development of 
social capital (Tomai et al., 2010), the negotiation of adolescence (Subrahmanyam & 
Greenfield, 2008), or offer less formal learning in affinity groups (Gee, 2005). Networks 
which support argument are of special interest due to their avowedly educational nature but 
we should not see all activity as argument. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explored the feasibility and usefulness of a Toulmin framework for understanding 
the quality of online discussion. It found that past research in the educational technology field 
left questions about the concept of online knowledge construction and methodological gaps in 
terms of analysis of content. The education literature filled in some of these gaps by reporting 
on the educational value of argument, the challenges in promoting argument, and alternative 
ways in which argument could be analysed. This literature led to Toulmin and the attraction 
of a Toulmin framework was threefold: it would consider content as well as form; rest on a 
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broadly pragmatic epistemology; and draw on an established research tradition. A Toulmin 
framework was then adapted to enable analysis of a discussion on whether should leave the 
EU. We concluded that this framework was feasible in that researchers were able to reach 
agreement on coding messages. However, such coding was necessarily challenging as it 
needed to consider content knowledge - both researcher and participant content knowledge. 
We further concluded that the framework was particularly useful for providing a focus on 
content and for allowing judgements on the quality of the debate. We see considerable value 
in a Toulmin approach though note that any framework needs to be adapted to the particular 
context of a study. We also argue for a range of approaches to online message analysis to 
reflect the spread of research questions which researchers ask and note there are other foci for 
research than the force of argument. 
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